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VERTICAL MERGERS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL EXIT 
D. Daniel Sokol 
Abstract 
The idea that tech companies should be permitted to acquire nascent 
start-ups is under attack from antitrust populists. Yet, this debate on 
vertical mergers has overlooked important empirical contributions 
regarding innovation-related mergers in the strategy literature. This 
Article explores the extant empirical strategy literature, which generally 
identifies a procompetitive basis that supports vertical mergers as 
efficiency enhancing. This literature solidifies the current general vertical 
merger presumption that favors a procompetitive vertical merger policy 
for purposes of government merger enforcement. However, the 
procompetitive benefit for a presumption of merger approval for most 
vertical mergers does not end with the synthesis of an under-explored 
literature. Rather, the broader implications of vertical mergers and 
presumptions of legality have another overlooked implication—a change 
of policy may dampen entrepreneurial investment and innovation. 
Entrepreneurial exit is critical to a well-functioning entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, as the possibility of entrepreneurial exit via vertical merger is 
now the most usual form of liquidity event/exit for founders and venture 
capitalists. Vertical merger policy that would unduly restrict large tech 
firms from undertaking acquisitions in industries as diverse as finance, 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, technology hardware, and internet 
platforms would hurt incentives for innovation in the economy by chilling 
business formation in start-ups. Increased difficulty in the exit for 
founders and venture capitalists makes investment in such ventures less 
likely, since the purpose of such investment is to reap the rewards of 
scaling a venture to exit. Thus, a general inference that makes vertical 
acquisitions, particularly in tech, more difficult to undertake leads to 
direct contravention of antitrust’s role in promoting competition and 
innovation. This Article explores how entrepreneurial exit for founders 
and venture capitalists is best served by promoting a robust vertical 
merger policy, though one that intervenes in cases of specific 
anticompetitive harm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental business question for growth firms has to do with 
understanding scale and scope, irrespectively of whether they are 
achieved through organic growth or acquisition.  Antitrust policy in the 
form of vertical merger policy helps provide parameters for both scale 
and scope both for incumbent firms and for start-ups that may be acquired 
by incumbent firms.  However, antitrust’s understanding of vertical 
merger policy has been limited by only focusing in the antitrust law and 
economics silo.  A broader understanding of entrepreneurship policy, 
firm market and non-market strategies better informs antitrust to provide 
for a closer to optimal policy framework, particularly in the current 
politically turbulent populist infused environment.  
I.  POLICY OVERVIEW 
Antitrust populism is on the rise.1 This populism has taken on a “big 
is bad” emphasis, particularly against tech companies. Under such an 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust’s Unconventional Politics, 104 VA L. REV. ONLINE 
118, 118 (2018) (detailing recent shifts on left and right towards populism); Thomas J. Horton, 
Restoring American Antitrust’s Moral Arc, 62 S.D. L. REV. 11, 47–48 (2017) (“We can start to 
reincorporate morality and ethics into antitrust by ending the use of normative neoclassical 
economic clichés that are inconsistent with our evolutionary history and heritage.”); Marina Lao, 
Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 649, 685 (2014) (“What is needed is 
an honest conversation on what values should matter and why they should matter in [antitrust] 
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approach, large firms are to be feared2 and vertical mergers by such firms 
(acquisitions of smaller tech companies) are to be treated with particular 
suspicion, both in the United States and Europe.3 In the United States, 
even the traditionally mainstream press, with its own business model 
threatened, has at times shown bias against vertical mergers4 and has even 
asked for antitrust immunity in its own vertical relations with online 
platforms.5 This backlash against tech—and the use of antitrust as a tool 
against large tech companies—has attracted support from left and right 
wing populist forces.6 
The changing political landscape, with a populist backlash against an 
antitrust policy consensus of the past generation,7 threatens to bring non-
                                                                                                                     
 2. FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 
(2017) 11–12, 29–31; SCOTT GALLOWAY, THE FOUR: THE HIDDEN DNA OF AMAZON, APPLE, 
FACEBOOK, AND GOOGLE 2, 8–9 (2017); Greg Ip, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook, Google 
and Amazon: A Few Technology Giants Dominate Their Worlds Just as Standard Oil and AT&T 
Once Did. Should They be Broken Up?, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 16, 2018, 11:52 A.M.), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-antitrust-case-against-facebook-google-amazon-and-apple-
1516121561 [https://perma.cc/67TM-LXB6].  
 3. Peter A. Angelov et al., Competitive Effects of Merger Remedies in Europe’s High-Tech 
Industry, 1, 3, 23–24 (Utrecht Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. 12–16, 2012),  
https://ideas.repec.org/p/use/tkiwps/1216.html [http://perma.cc/VT3L-PYT3]; Caroline Holland, 
Taking on Big Tech Through Merger Enforcement, MEDIUM (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://medium.com/read-write-participate/taking-on-big-tech-through-merger-enforcement-
f15b7973e37 [http://perma.cc/F569-XFT4]; U.S. House Democrats, A Better Deal: Cracking 
Down on Corporate Monopolies & the Abuse of Economic and Political Power, BETTER 
DEAL, https://abetterdeal.democraticleader.gov/the-proposals/crack-down-on-abuse-of-power/ 
[http://perma.cc/ZQU6-MZMR]. 
 4. Schumpeter, America’s Antitrust Apparatus Prepares to Act Against Big Tech, 
ECONOMIST (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21741173-university-
chicago-conclave-experts-debates-how-far-go-americas-antitrust-apparatus [http://perma.cc/ 
M5E2-QU3C].  
 5. Journalism Competition and Preservation Act, H.R. 5190, 115th Cong. (2018), 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr5190 [http://perma.cc/AX6V-MYGH].  
 6. Crane, supra note 1. 
 7. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. 
Antitrust Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497, 2506–07 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant Firm, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT 
THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 109, 111–10 
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008); William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. 
Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (analyzing the fusion of Chicago and Harvard traditions); William 
E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 43, 58 (2000) (“Today, the links between economics and law have been 
institutionalized with increasing presence of an economic perspective in law schools, extensive 
and explicit judicial reliance on economic theory, and with substantial presence of economists in 
the government antitrust agencies.”); Andrew Finch, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks 
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economic aspects into antitrust law and policy.8 Even if there is not a 
fundamental change to antitrust law as a result of these pressures, policy 
may reflect changing political winds on the margins in both the agencies 
and the courts.9 The problem with changes to vertical merger law10 and 
policy11 is that because many deals are approved without much of a 
record (and even consents do not often offer much guidance beyond a 
short press release), there is often not good, publicly available data—or 
natural experiments to undertake—to guide policy. Thus, evidence on 
which to base policy is more limited in the area of vertical mergers than 
in other areas of antitrust, including horizontal mergers.  
Optimal policy requires a set of rules that courts and agencies can use 
to evaluate a merger to the extent that the antitrust agencies go to court to 
block a vertical deal, to threaten to block such a deal, to allow a deal with 
a consent, or to allow a deal without any conditions. This is why vertical 
merger policy is a question of inference.12 That is, by inference, as a 
matter of optimal policy, should we believe that vertical mergers are more 
(or less) likely to lead to potential anticompetitive effects? Next, how do 
we create a set of legal rules that support this inference? For policy, the 
question should be what sort of inference should we use—one that 
presumptively favors or disfavors vertical mergers? The inference helps 
                                                                                                                     
[https://perma.cc/4MAD-3DFA] (“Economics has played, and will continue to play, a 
fundamental role in antitrust enforcement.”).  
 8. D. Daniel Sokol, Troubled Waters Between U.S. and European Antitrust, 115 MICH. L. 
REV. 955, 957–58 (2017) (discussing that antitrust is based on economic effects rather than the 
protection of inefficient competitors and industrial policy). Calls to reinvigorate antitrust based 
on cases from the nadir of antitrust in the 1950s and 1960s that were based on non-economic goals 
hurt consumers. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Bork’s Strategy and the Influence of the Chicago 
School on Modern Antitrust Law, 57 J.L. ECON. 1, 3–4 (2014) (describing the cases and critiques 
therein). 
 9. For some recent examples of pushing antitrust to a more expansionist economics-based 
stance based on existing case law, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal 
Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018) and C. Scott 
Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers That Harm Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 2078 (2018). 
 10. IVA PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1000a, at 137 (3d ed. 2009) (describing a 
“vertical merger” as a merger “between a firm selling a particular product or service and a firm 
that buys that product or service”). 
 11. See generally Michael Salinger, Vertical Mergers, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 551 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015) 
(providing a literature review). 
 12. See generally James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of 
Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639 (2005) (discussing the factors considered in determining 
vertical merger policy). 
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to set a general policy framework that can be adapted on a case-by-case 
basis.13 
Based on a synthesis of the empirical scholarship and the broader 
concerns of creating regulatory/antitrust barriers to exit by founders and 
venture capitalists, an inference of a more lenient vertical merger policy 
relative to that of horizontal mergers should be favored. To be sure, there 
will be some vertical mergers that are potentially anticompetitive,14 
including those in the area of technology. However, this Article advocates 
that the best way to address such mergers is on a case-by-case basis that 
is fact-specific, consistent with current law and policy.15 Courts and 
antitrust agencies are better off creating more explicit guidance to signal 
the factors for those vertical mergers that are higher risk than creating a 
system that would de facto overwhelm antitrust agencies’ resources with 
challenges that discourage innovation and reduce consumer welfare.16  
The current set of policy presumptions on vertical mergers, for both 
opponents and proponents of the current system, is often based on the 
                                                                                                                     
 13. Section seven of the Clayton Act contains an incipiency standard requiring prediction 
of events that (in general) have yet to occur. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). Incipiency has not been 
used vigorously. But see Peter C. Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine 
and the Importance of 'Redundant’ Competitors, 2018 WISC. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript 
at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3134480 (arguing for a revitalized 
incipiency standard).  
 14. See, e.g., William P. Rogerson, Economic Theories of Harm Raised by the Proposed 
Comcast/TWC Transaction (2015), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, 
AND POLICY (John E. Kwoka, Jr. and Lawrence J. White eds., 7th ed. 2018). For a review of 
successful vertical merger consents see FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC’S MERGER REMEDIES 
2006-2012: A REPORT OF THE BUREAUS OF COMPETITION AND ECONOMICS 7 (2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/ftcs-merger-remedies-2006-2012-report-bureaus-competition-
economics [https://perma.cc/K9LR-9GNP]. 
 15. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 194 (D.D.C. 2018) (“To sum up, the 
Court accepts that vertical mergers ‘are not invariably innocuous,’ but instead can generate 
competitive harm ‘[i]n certain circumstances.’ The case at hand therefore turns on whether, 
notwithstanding the proposed merger’s conceded procompetitive effects, the Government has met 
its burden of proof of establishing, through ‘case-specific evidence,’ that the merger of AT&T 
and Time Warner, at this time and in this remarkably dynamic industry, is likely to substantially 
lessen competition in the manner it predicts.” (citations omitted) (alteration in original)); AREEDA 
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 10 (“[T]he basic economic reason for limiting horizontal mergers is 
well-founded and rather generally accepted: horizontal mergers increase market concentration, 
and high market concentration can substantially lessen competition among rivals, particularly 
with respect to price. Unfortunately, there is no comparable theoretical basis for dealing with 
vertical mergers.”). 
 16. Support for a merger presumption that favors clearing vertical mergers that does not 
cause specific cases of foreclosure holds across scholarship both in the United States and Europe. 
See, e.g., MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 378 (2004); Michael 
H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 
ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 517 (1995); Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 
127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1963–64 (2018). 
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same handful of empirical industrial organization studies.17 Yet, the 
debate has overlooked important empirical contributions regarding 
innovation-related mergers in the strategy literature. This strategy 
literature identifies a procompetitive basis that supports vertical mergers 
as efficiency enhancing.18 Such a literature solidifies the current vertical 
merger presumption that agencies undertake in their analysis, which 
favors a procompetitive vertical merger policy for purposes of 
enforcement.19   
The procompetitive benefit of a presumption of merger approval for 
vertical mergers does not end with the synthesis of an under-explored 
literature. Rather, the broader implications of vertical mergers and 
presumptions of legality have another overlooked implication—a change 
of policy may dampen entrepreneurial investment and innovation.  
Entrepreneurial exit is critical to a well-functioning entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, as the possibility of entrepreneurial exit via vertical merger is 
now the most usual form of liquidity event/exit for founders and venture 
capitalists. Vertical merger policy that would unduly restrict large tech 
firms from undertaking acquisitions in industries as diverse as finance, 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, hardware, and internet platforms 
would hurt incentives for innovation in the economy by chilling business 
formation in start-ups. Increased difficulty in the exit for founders and 
ventures capitalists makes investment in such ventures less likely, since 
the purpose of such investment is to reap the rewards of scaling a venture 
to exit.20 Thus, a general inference that makes vertical acquisitions, 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Riordan & Salop, supra note 16, at 515 n.15 (providing the traditional papers in favor 
of an inference, though a number are not vertical merger papers); Salop, supra note 16, at 1987 
n.103 (offering additional studies although some of the studies listed are not vertical merger 
papers and other procompetitive studies are missed). See generally Salinger, supra note 11 
(summarizing these studies). 
 18. See infra Part II. There is also smaller finance literature that shows efficiencies in 
vertical acquisitions. See, e.g., Jan Bena & Kai Li, Corporate Innovations and Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 69 J. FIN. 1923, 1955 (2014); Gerard Hoberg & Gordon Phillips, Product Market 
Synergies and Competition in Mergers and Acquisitions: A Text-Based Analysis, 23 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 3773, 3808 (2010); Simi Kedia et al., When Do Vertical Mergers Create Value?, 40 FIN. 
MGMT. 845, 872 (2011); Gordon M. Phillips & Alexei Zhdanov, R&D and the Incentives from 
Merger and Acquisition Activity, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 34, 71–72 (2012); Matthew J. Higgins & 
Daniel Rodriguez, The Outsourcing of R&D Through Acquisition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
80 J. FIN. ECON. 351 (2006); Laurent Frésard et al., Vertical Acquisitions, Integration and the 
Boundaries of the Firm 37 (Dec. 20, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2242425  [https://perma.cc/7Z88-B3WS]. 
 19. In no way does this mean that in particular cases where vertical mergers present 
competition problems should enforcement be diminished. In such particular cases, intervention is 
warranted. 
 20. Harry J. Sapienza et al., The Self-Determination Motive and Entrepreneurs’ Choice of 
Financing, in COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 105, 106 (Jerome A. 
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particularly in tech, more difficult to approve leads to direct 
contravention of antitrust’s role in promoting competition and 
innovation.21 This Article explores how entrepreneurial exit for founders 
and venture capitalists is best served by promoting a robust vertical 
merger policy, though one that intervenes in cases of specific 
anticompetitive harm. 
II.  ANTITRUST AND VERTICAL MERGERS 
This Part provides an overview of vertical merger law and economics. 
It synthesizes these literatures into a workable set of legal rules. 
A.  Vertical Merger Law 
Antitrust law and policy presumes vertical integration via merger to 
be typically procompetitive.22 This has been the case for a generation.23 
Typically, there is little cause for antitrust concern when both the 
upstream and downstream markets are not concentrated.24 Similarly, 
when the market is competitive, a vertical merger that leads to foreclosure 
may not have an anticompetitive effect.25 
Broadly, vertical mergers can be contrasted with horizontal mergers. 
In horizontal mergers, antitrust policy has been guided by the horizontal 
                                                                                                                     
Katz & Dean A. Shepherd eds., 2003) (“[W]ealth maximization and self-determination are the 
two primary motives driving entrepreneurial financing choices.”); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit 
Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 316 (2005) (“Before venture capitalists 
invest, they plan for exit. That is, they plan to withdraw their investment, adjusted for any return, 
from the entrepreneur’s company. The ability to control exit is crucial to the venture capitalist’s 
business model of short-term funding of nascent business opportunities.”).  
 21. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2003) (“Innovation benefits consumers through 
the development of new and improved goods, services, and processes. An economy’s capacity for 
invention and innovation helps drive its economic growth and the degree to which standards of 
living increase. Technological breakthroughs such as automobiles, airplanes, the personal 
computer, the Internet, television, telephones, and modern pharmaceuticals illustrate the power of 
innovation to increase prosperity and improve the quality of our lives.” (footnote omitted)). 
 22. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶ 1000b, at 139.  
 23. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 219 
(1978). But see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES 9–10 (1968), www.justice.gov/ 
atr/hmerger/11247.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9TS-QU7W] (“[I]ntegration accomplished by a large 
vertical merger will usually raise entry barriers or disadvantage competitors to an extent not 
accounted for by, and wholly disproportionate to, such economies as may result from the 
merger.”). 
 24. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶ 1032a, at 234. Unless “both markets are 
highly concentrated,” “a vertical merger cannot cause significant foreclosure of existing firms.” 
Id. 
 25. See id. at 159 (“[F]oreclosure has no anticompetitive effect whatsoever in competitive 
markets and often little effect in oligopolistic markets.”). 
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merger guidelines26 and case law27 that has embraced these guidelines. 
Unlike the more frequent and up-to-date horizontal merger case law, 
vertical merger antitrust law lacks both significant case law and up-to-
date guidelines.28 Given significantly outdated vertical merger 
guidelines,29 what we understand about antitrust vertical merger practice 
primarily comes from deals allowed, as well as consents and deals 
abandoned.30 In most cases, vertical mergers have been cleared because 
anticompetitive effects are outweighed by potential efficiencies or 
because there are no anticompetitive effects.31  
One complexity that leads to some uncertainty in U.S. vertical merger 
antitrust law is the paucity of case law. Indeed, the last time that the 
Supreme Court decided a vertical merger case was in 1972.32 Privately 
litigated vertical merger cases that result in a decision are also rare. The 
last time a Circuit Court decided a private vertical merger case was in 
1987.33 Similarly, the last time a district court decided a private vertical 
merger case was in 1997.34  
The recent United States v. AT&T Inc.35 vertical merger case promised 
the possibility of some additional clarity on vertical merger case law. 
However, while the decision lays out a number of arguments in favor of 
and against vertical merger enforcement, the case broke no new legal 
                                                                                                                     
 26. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 29 
(2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7QV2-D6BF].  
 27. Hillary Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 100 
IOWA L. REV. 2039, 2055–57 (2015). 
 28. It is lamentable that Judge Leon cited to the ossified vertical merger guidelines in his 
AT&T decision. 
 29. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11249.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
PMM8-TMEP] (showing that the guidelines for vertical mergers have not been updated since 
1984). 
 30. Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Revising the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: 
Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1, 4–5 
(2016). 
 31. See James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, Getting Vertical Deals Through the 
Agencies: “Let’s Make a Deal,” 29 ANTITRUST 10, 11–12 (2015); Riordan & Salop, supra note 
16, at 519 (“[M]any vertical mergers create vertical integration efficiencies between purchasers 
and sellers . . . .”); David T. Scheffman & Richard S. Higgins, Vertical Mergers: Theory and 
Policy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 967, 976 (2004); Paul Yde, Non-Horizontal Merger Challenges: 
A Solution in Search of a Problem, 22 ANTITRUST 74, 81 (2007). 
 32. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 562 (1972). 
 33. Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1236 (3d 
Cir. 1987). 
 34. HTI Health Servs., Inc. v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (S.D. 
Miss. 1997). 
 35. 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 
8
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 6 [2019], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss6/5
2018] VERTICAL MERGERS AND ENTREPRENEURAL EXIT 1365 
 
ground and Judge Richard J. Leon went out of his way, multiple times, to 
note that the decision was based on a highly specific factual setting.36 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) offered three theories of how the 
merger between AT&T Inc. and Time Warner Inc. would be 
anticompetitive.37 The first alleged that post-merger, Turner (part of Time 
Warner) would be able to leverage its position in the combined firm (via 
video distributors, U-verse, and DirecTV) to demand higher prices from 
its rival multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs).38 The 
basis for this claim was that the combined firm would be able to offset, 
at least partially, any loss of advertising and fees from potential licensing 
blackouts by consumers that would switch to DirecTV (already owned 
by AT&T), which would have Turner content.39 The court rejected this 
claim.40 
The second alleged harm was that the combined company would be 
able to harm virtual (internet) MVPDs through its ownership of Time 
Warner content.41 The DOJ alleged both unilateral effects and 
coordinated effects theories of harm.42 The court rejected the DOJ’s 
claims of both unilateral43 and coordinated effects44 that would foreclose 
“must have” Turner content.  
The third theory of harm was based on the combined firm withholding 
HBO promotions, that is, “that the combined entity will have the 
‘incentive and ability’ to prevent rival distributors from using HBO as a 
promotional tool to attract and retain customers.”45 Under this theory, the 
court’s response was to conclude, “At the risk of stating the obvious, this 
is a gossamer thin claim.”46 Instead, the court found that the DOJ failed 
to provide an explanation as to why the merged firm would have any 
                                                                                                                     
 36. Id. at 194 (“The case at hand therefore turns on whether, notwithstanding the proposed 
merger's conceded procompetitive effects, the Government has met its burden of proof of 
establishing, through ‘case-specific evidence,’ that the merger of AT&T and Time Warner, at this 
time and in this remarkably dynamic industry, is likely to substantially lessen competition in the 
manner it predicts.”). 
 37. Id. at 204.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 205.  
 40. Id. at 241 (concluding that the Government’s case did not provide an “adequate basis to 
conclude that the challenged merger will lead to any raised costs on the part of distributors or 
consumers—much less consumer harms that outweigh the conceded $350 million in annual cost 
savings to AT&T’s customers”). 
 41. Id. at 242.  
 42. Id. at 243, 246.  
 43. Id. at 244–45. 
 44. Id. at 248–49.  
 45. Id. at 249–50. 
 46. Id. at 250.  
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incentive to withhold HBO promotions or as to why the HBO promotions 
were that valuable at all.47  
The overall conclusion from this case is that it did not break any new 
legal ground. It acknowledged existing theories of harm as well as 
procompetitive justifications for mergers. Its flowery—perhaps even 
occasionally snarky—language aside, the case offers very little that is 
new in the development of vertical merger case law. It is an important 
case because vertical merger cases are so rare, and because the players 
and the industry are particularly prominent ones that received significant 
national attention. Its broader significance is limited, possibly to this 
particular industry, which may, as a result, accelerate further mergers as 
firms may view the DOJ as having become weakened in its ability to 
bring a major case.48 Perhaps the AT&T decision on appeal will shed 
more light onto the proper set of presumptions and legal doctrine for 
vertical merger case law analysis. 
B.  Vertical Merger Economics 
The benefits and potential anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers 
as a theoretical matter are well known.49 Vertical mergers may improve 
innovation, lead to lower transaction costs, or reduce costs in the supply 
chain, such as the costs of production or distribution.50  
One of the values of vertical integration via merger is the concept of 
asset specificity.51 The more specific the asset is, the better the result from 
vertical integration.52 The reason for this result is that in situations where 
a firm needs to invest in a specialized asset (and where market exchange 
is difficult), vertical integration leads to an efficient outcome.53 The 
seminal work by Pablo Spiller examines the market power versus asset 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Id. at 251 n.60 (“Put simply, HBO is in the fight of its life [from Netflix]!”). 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
(showing the impact of the DOJ loss in the Oracle/Peoplesoft merger); see also D. Daniel Sokol, 
Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1085 (2010) (noting 
how judicial decisions may have chilled DOJ merger challenges in court).  
 49. See, e.g., Salinger, supra note 11 (providing a literature review). 
 50. Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703, 720 
(2017); Joseph Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347, 347 
(1950).  
 51. Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, in HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 188, 213–14 (Richard Schmallensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); 
Oliver Williamson, Credible Commitments Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. 
REV. 519, 523–24 (1983).  
 52. Perry, supra note 51.  
 53. Barak D. Richman & Jeffrey T. Macher, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment 
of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1, 38 (2008); Howard A. Shelanski 
& Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 
11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335, 336 (1995). 
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specificity possibilities that drive vertical mergers.54 Spiller studied 
changes in stock prices after a merger announcement and found that the 
lower the site specificity, the lower the gains from the merger, and that 
concentration had no effect.55 His cross industry findings support the case 
for asset specificity in vertical mergers.  
Similarly, vertical mergers may solve problems of double 
marginalization between upstream and downstream companies.56 
Vertical mergers create efficiencies by eliminating the double 
marginalization that simply does not exist for horizontal mergers. Indeed, 
the greater the market power of each party to the vertical merger, the 
greater the potential efficiencies.57 Finally, vertical and conglomerate 
mergers may create positive externalities for consumers due to increased 
innovation.58 
However, vertical mergers also may potentially create anticompetitive 
effects. Vertical mergers may lead to input foreclosure. This includes 
situations in which the merging firm raises its prices or refuses to sell 
competing downstream firms a critical input, raises rivals’ costs, or helps 
to facilitate downstream collusion.59 Similarly, the foreclosure may 
involve downstream firms (customer foreclosure) in which a downstream 
firm makes exclusive purchases or reduced purchases of an input from 
the upstream unit of the merged firm.60 Both can be thought of as different 
forms of a raising rival’s cost (RRC) strategy—input foreclosure is the 
traditional RRC strategy, while customer foreclosure results in a potential 
RRC strategy regarding distribution.61 Potential entry62 and information 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Pablo Spiller, On Vertical Mergers, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 285, 286–87 (1985); see also 
Avi Weiss, The Role of Firm-Specific Capital in Vertical Mergers, 35 J.L. & ECON. 71, 74 (1992) 
(discussing Spiller’s work). 
 55. See Spiller, supra note 54, at 304.  
 56. MOTTA, supra note 16, at 307–08.   
 57. Roger D. Blair et al., Hospital Mergers and Economic Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1, 
24–25 (2016) (explaining the benefits of vertical integration). 
 58. Double marginalization in multi-sided markets presents somewhat complex challenges, 
where consumers already pay zero on one side of a platform pre-merger and continue to pay zero 
post-merger. However, an efficiency gain could still arise. To be sure, it seems necessary to 
examine why the price is zero on one side of the market (and whether it continues to be zero after 
the merger) and what the prices are both pre- and post-merger on the other side of the market.  
 59. Salop, supra note 16, at 1975.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 
538 n.54 (2013).  
 62. Bruce Hoffman, Acting Dir. of Bureau of Competition, Remarks at Credit Suisse 2018 
Washington Perspectives Conference: Vertical Merger Enforcement at the FTC 4–5 (Jan. 
10, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1304213/hoffman_ 
vertical_merger_speech_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WM9-QYU8] (“Today, we are still 
concerned about how entry could occur post-merger, but now we are interested in cases in which 
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exchange63 can also become issues in vertical mergers. 
As a practical matter, there is inherent ambiguity in many vertical 
mergers.64 Recent academic literature in industrial organization 
economics suggests that there are often both anticompetitive effects65 and 
efficiency enhancing effects in vertical mergers.66 In terms of the effects 
in any given case, one type of effect can outweigh the other.  
Structuring an efficient rule in the context of cases that may have 
potentially procompetitive and anticompetitive effects is challenging. 
Moreover, merger control is about ex ante prediction. In such contexts, 
prediction is more difficult in vertical mergers than in horizontal 
mergers.67 Thus, when analyzing a vertical merger ex ante, it is more 
difficult to predict the net effect. This ambiguity of effect is different than 
in the horizontal arena, where the effects are often easier to legally 
presume based on case law68 and guidelines.69 
Economic analysis and legal presumptions based on such analysis 
play an important role in antitrust and its administrability. This is explicit 
                                                                                                                     
the firms are most likely to enter each other’s market—something akin to a special case of 
potential competition. We look at whether there is something about the markets at issue—
something like assets, know-how, or reputation—that indicates that having a presence in another 
vertically-related market or in another part of the distribution chain makes it inherently more 
likely or easier for the merging firms to enter each other’s markets, as compared to de novo entry 
by another firm. We also look at entry facilitation; that is, whether prior to the merger, one firm 
had an incentive to sponsor entry, and absent the merger, that the firm would have partnered with 
another company to enter into the markets of the acquiring firm.”). 
 63. See Salop, supra note 16, at 1978. 
 64. See Richard J. Gilbert & Hillary Greene, Merging Innovation into Antitrust Agency 
Enforcement of the Clayton Act, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1919, 1938 (2015). 
 65. See, e.g., Justine S. Hastings & Richard J. Gilbert, Market Power, Vertical Integration 
and the Wholesale Price of Gasoline, 53 J. IND. ECON. 469, 482 (2005) (providing that vertical 
mergers may lead to higher wholesale prices charged to competitors).  
 66. See, e.g., Jaideep Shenoy, An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion 
Rationales for Vertical Takeovers, 58 MGMT. SCI. 1482, 1482 (2012) (finding vertical mergers 
are efficiency enhancing); Christopher T. Taylor et al., Vertical Relationships and Competition in 
Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California: 
Comment, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1269, 1269 (2010) (finding that the results of Hastings and Gilbert 
cannot be reproduced and that there is no anticompetitive effect).  
 67. Hoffman, supra note 62, at 3 (“Unfortunately, compared to horizontal mergers, there 
are also fewer quantitative theoretical models that we can use to attempt to predict outcomes in 
vertical scenarios, and the models that exist have a far shorter track record than those used in 
assessing horizontal mergers.”). 
 68. See United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The more 
compelling the prima facie case, the more evidence the defendant must present to rebut it 
successfully.”); see also Sean P. Sullivan, What Structural Presumption?: Reuniting Evidence 
and Economics on the Role of Market Concentration in Horizontal Merger Analysis, 42 J. CORP. 
L. 403, 410–23 (2016) (discussing an analysis of the burden shift framework and structural 
presumptions). 
 69. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 26, at 1. 
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in Supreme Court cases. As the Court stated most recently in 2015 in 
Kimble v. Marvel,70 “We have therefore felt relatively free to revise our 
legal analysis as economic understanding evolves and . . . to reverse 
antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive 
consequences.”71 Thus, unlike other areas of law, stare decisis plays a 
more limited role in antitrust.72 Rather, antitrust common law develops 
via changes in economic analysis.73 
In the context of a more limited role for stare decisis, a review of 
vertical merger law is in order. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,74 the 
Supreme Court explained “[t]he primary vice of a vertical merger” as 
“foreclosing the competitors of either party from a segment of the 
market.”75 However, the basis of Brown Shoe was a belief that the 
purpose of antitrust was “to promote competition through the protection 
of viable, small, locally owned businesses” even though the result would 
be “higher costs and prices [that] might result from the maintenance of 
fragmented industries and markets.” 76 Since Brown Shoe, vertical merger 
case law has been sparse, though vertical restraints law more generally 
has been narrowed based on an understanding that efficiencies 
outweighed anticompetitive harm.77 Until the courts narrow vertical 
merger law to reflect the current economic learning, Supreme Court cases 
based on a rationale that today would be dismissed remain good case 
law.78  
Few cases are decided by courts in the vertical merger area.  As a 
result, most of the precedent that exists is through agency practice.  Some 
of these practices create external signals through consents or press 
                                                                                                                     
 70. 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).  
 71. Id. at 2412–13. 
 72. Barak Orbach, Antitrust Stare Decisis, 15 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1 (2015). 
 73. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 214 n.7 
(1985). 
 74. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).  
 75. Id. at 323–24. 
 76. Id. at 344.  
 77. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881–82 (2007) 
(minimum resale price maintenance); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 
546 U.S. 164, 169–70 (2006) (secondary line Robinson-Patman); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 
3, 7 (1997) (maximum resale price maintenance); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 216–17, 219 (1993) (primary line Robinson-Patman); Cont’l 
Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977) (non-price vertical restraints). 
 78. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and 
Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 912 (2010) (“Today, the antitrust landscape differs so much from the 
view of Brown Shoe that one could barely recognize it from that vantage point.”). See generally 
D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the Rule of Reason, 
and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003 (2013) (providing an evolution of doctrine in a 
number of vertical restraints in antitrust law). 
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releases by the agencies.  Overall, what drives vertical merger policy is 
the “law in action” of antitrust legal practice of potential merging parties 
before the antitrust agencies, most of which never results in litigation. 
This is the so-called “shadow of the law” of merger practice.79 Professor 
Michael Salinger, when he headed the Bureau of Economics at the FTC, 
explained the reality of the complexities and ambiguities of vertical 
mergers from a practical perspective as opposed to the theoretical 
perspective: 
In evaluating vertical mergers, we must never forget that the 
economics of vertical relationships is fundamentally 
different from the economics of horizontal relationships. 
Two rivals generally have a mutual incentive to increase 
their prices. A company and either its supplier or distributor 
generally have a mutual incentive to lower their prices. We 
should never lose sight of that basic distinction. . . . If we 
focus too much on theoretical exceptions to the general 
rule—and there is a real risk of doing so simply because they 
are intellectually more interesting—then we will get the 
emphasis wrong. The basic dilemma in vertical merger 
policy is how to identify the presumably small number of 
vertical mergers that might be harmful to competition.80 
Salinger’s insights suggest that vertical merger policy should not react to 
political currents. Rather, vertical merger policy should be guided by a 
careful understanding of economics in identifying the right sort of cases 
to bring that match theories of legal harm. Antitrust is best served when 
the agencies offer clearer guidance as to high, medium, and low risk for 
vertical merger based on these economic presumptions of harm, 
depending on different levels of risk for potential anticompetitive 
practices. Ideally, agency guidance would be based on a presumption that 
most vertical merger deals do not raise antitrust concerns, which the 
robust empirical literature and framing of how and why tech firms acquire 
smaller firms support.81 This is a message often lost in the current policy 
debates. 
                                                                                                                     
 79. D. Daniel Sokol & James A. Fishkin, Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of 
the Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 47 (2011) (“Indeed, most ‘action’ in mergers generally 
and in merger efficiencies specifically occurs in dynamics between the agencies and outside 
counsel (including economists employed by outside counsel) in various stages of the merger 
notification process.”).  
 80. Michael A. Salinger, Dir. of Bureau of Econ., Remarks at the Association of 
Competition Economics Seminar on Non-Horizontal Mergers: Is it live or is it Memorex? Models 
of Vertical Mergers and Antitrust Enforcement 1–2 (Sept. 7, 2005), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/salinger/050927isitlive.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6PS-46TE].  
 81. Will Drover et al., A Review and Road Map of Entrepreneurial Equity Financing 
Research: Venture Capital, Corporate Venture Capital, Angel Investment, Crowdfunding, and 
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III.  VERTICAL MERGERS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY 
There has not been much antitrust literature devoted to the wealth 
transfer effects of mergers, and what discussion does exist has been at a 
general level. The insight on the importance of well-functioning merger 
and acquisitions markets was first noted in the second edition of the 
Areeda antitrust treatise. Areeda wrote, “To facilitate exit when it is 
desired may indeed facilitate entry. The likelihood of exit with minimum 
loss or maximum gain increases the attractiveness and reduces the risk of 
entering a market.”82 This idea was first explicitly recognized by the 
antitrust agencies in the 1979 Pillsbury decision in the context of the sale 
of family owned businesses.83 While implicit in agency decision-making, 
the next explicit mention of this idea, to the author’s knowledge, was not 
until 2008, by then FTC General Counsel William Blumenthal in an ICN 
merger workshop speech.84 
Other than these three express statements, the entrepreneurial exit 
rationale for mergers has not come up in antitrust literature. Further, there 
have been no explicit comments by the two antitrust agencies or the 
courts about wealth transfer in the high tech entrepreneurial setting. Such 
relative silence is perhaps surprising. Antitrust is focused on how 
competition typically reduces prices, increases quality, and/or supports 
innovation. High tech entrepreneurship is about the process of bringing 
an idea to market in terms of commercialization and exit.85 This Article 
extends this discussion specifically to the case of vertical tech mergers 
and exit to discuss entrepreneurial exits. 
A.  Business Models of Companies are Built Around Vertical Mergers 
For the past thirty years, antitrust literature has largely ignored the 
significant literature within strategy related to vertical integration in the 
technology setting. Overall, this literature shows the important 
                                                                                                                     
Accelerators, 43 J. MGMT 1820 (providing a literature review). 
 82. PHILIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ¶ 617(h), at 690 (2d ed. 1974). 
 83. Pillsbury Co., 93 F.T.C. 966, 1041 (1979). 
 84. William Blumenthal, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks before the ICN 
Merger Notification & Procedures Workshop: Implementing the Recommended Practices, The 




 85. D. Daniel Sokol, Do We Need a New Synthesis of Law and STEM? Law and STEM 
Collaboration in Entrepreneurship, Bridges II: The Law—STEM Alliance & Next Generation 
Innovation, 112 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 163, 163 (“Generally speaking, entrepreneurship involves 
new products or services or new ways of organizing businesses. A key feature of these 
entrepreneurial opportunities is their novelty. In the STEM context, entrepreneurial opportunities 
focus on high growth business opportunities that are technologically driven.”). 
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efficiency-enhancing effects of vertical mergers. These mergers are 
largely complementary, combining the strengths of the acquiring firm in 
process innovation with the product innovation of the target firms.86 This 
literature helps to push for a presumption for vertical merger law and 
policy to generally tolerate vertical mergers.87 
Acquisition may be the way in which the parties to vertical contracting 
may reduce transaction costs through vertical integration via merger. 
Many large firms acquire smaller firms in vertical mergers with the belief 
that the acquisition will allow the acquirer to create efficiencies that are 
not possible merely by licensing, strategic alliance, or joint venture.88  
Large firms need acquisitions to help with innovation.89 Innovation is 
critical for firms because greater innovation leads to improved financial 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Gautam Ahuja & Riitta Katila, Technological Acquisitions and the Innovation 
Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Longitudinal Study, 22 STRAT. MGMT. J. 197, 199 (2001); 
Jaideep Anand & Harbir Singh, Asset Redeployment, Acquisitions and Corporate Strategy in 
Declining Industries, 18 STRAT. MGMT. J. 99, 100 (1997); Bruno Cassiman & Reinhilde 
Veugelers, In Search of Complementarity in Innovation Strategy: Internal R&D and External 
Knowledge Acquisition, 52 MGMT. SCI. 68, 68 (2006); Seungho Choi & Gerry McNamara, 
Repeating a Familiar Pattern in a New Way: The Effect of Exploitation and Exploration on 
Knowledge Leverage Behaviors in Technology Acquisitions, 39 STRAT. MGMT. J. 356, 358 (2018); 
Melissa E. Grabner et al., Success and Failure in Technology Acquisitions: Lessons for Buyers 
and Sellers, 24 ACAD. MGMT. PESP. 73, 77 (2010); Rebecca Henderson & Ian Cockburn, Scale, 
Scope, and Spillovers, the Determinants of Research Productivity in Drug Discovery, 27 RAND 
J. ECON. 32, 33 (1996); Phanish Puranam & Kannan Srikanth, What They Know Versus What 
They Do: How Acquirers Leverage Technology Acquisitions, 28 STRAT. MGMT. J. 805, 806 
(2007); Zhuoxin Li & Ashish Agarwal, Platform Integration and Demand Spillovers in 
Complementary Markets: Evidence from Facebook's Integration of Instagram, 63 MGMT SCI. 
3147, 3438 (2017). 
 87. See, e.g., Matthew J. Higgins & Daniel Rodriguez, The Outsourcing of R&D Through 
Acquisition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 351, 352 (2006); Michael G. 
Jacobides & Stephan Billinger, Designing the Boundaries of the Firm: From “Make, Buy, or 
Ally” to the Dynamic Benefits of Vertical Architecture, 17 ORG. SCI. 249, 249 (2006); Gordon 
Walker & David Weber, Supplier Competition, Uncertainty, and Make-or-Buy Decisions, 30 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 589, 595 (1987); Claudio Wolter & Francisco M. Veloso, The Effects of 
Innovation on Vertical Structure: Perspectives on Transaction Costs and Competences, 33 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 586, 602 (2008). See generally Glenn Hoetker, How Much You Know Versus How 
Well I Know You: Selecting a Supplier for a Technically Innovative Component, 26 STRAT. MGMT. 
J. 75 (2005) (discussing how firms select a supplier for a new component of a product). 
 88. See, e.g., Enghin Atalay et al., Vertical Integration and Input Flows, 104 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1120, 1121 (2014); Joseph C. Mullin & Wallace P. Mullin, United States Steel’s Acquisition 
of the Great Northern Ore Properties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient Contractual 
Governance?, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 96 (1997); Jaideep Shenoy, An Examination of the 
Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers, 58 MGMT. SCI. 1482, 
1482 (2012). 
 89. See Jaideep C. Prabhu et al., The Impact of Acquisitions on Innovation: Poison Pill, 
Placebo, or Tonic?, 69 J. MARKETING 114, 114 (2005); Sam Ransbotham & Sabyasachi Mitra, 
Target Age and the Acquisition of Innovation in High-Technology Industries, 56 MGMT. SCI. 
2076, 2076 (2010). 
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returns.90 The race to innovate is particularly important in technology 
related industries where there is rapid change in and for the market.91  
When firms reach a certain size and level of complexity, they tend to 
be poor at product innovation.92 Rather, the strength of larger firms lies 
in process innovation because of familiarity and repetition of routines and 
processes that reduce both search costs and information costs related to 
the transfer of knowledge.93 In order to innovate, larger firms need to 
acquire smaller firms to utilize the technology that the target firm 
possess.94 A number of reasons explain this strategy of acquisition vis-à-
vis internal growth.95 This includes lower entry barriers via acquisition,96 
acquisition of intellectual property and research and development (R&D) 
that can be used strategically,97 knowledge,98 economies of scale and 
scope,99 and the ability to exert greater control rights through vertical 
integration via merger rather than via contract.100  
An additional reason to acquire a smaller tech-related start-up is what 
we might think of as “out of market efficiencies,” though viewed from a 
resource-based management perspective, in which a firm’s competitive 
advantage is based on the bundle of its resources (assets and capabilities) 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Frank T. Rothaermel et al., Balancing Vertical Integration and Strategic Outsourcing: 
Effects on Product Portfolio, Product Success, and Firm Performance, 27 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1033, 
1033 (2006). 
 91. See Nandini Lahiri & Sriram Narayanan, Vertical Integration, Innovation, and Alliance 
Portfolio Size: Implications for Firm Performance, 34 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1042, 1045 (2013). 
 92. See Gary Dushnitsky & Michael J. Lenox, When do Firms Undertake R&D by Investing 
in New Ventures?, 26 STRAT. MGMT. J. 947, 948–49 (2005) (“[E]ntrepreneurial ventures are likely 
to be the source of highly valuable and innovative ideas.”). 
 93. See Lahiri & Narayanan, supra note 91, at 1046–47.  
 94. See Michael B. Heeley et al., Effects of Firm R&D Investment and Environment on 
Acquisition Likelihood, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1513, 1513–16 (2006).  
 95. Jerayr Haleblian et al., Taking Stock of What We Know About Mergers and Acquisitions: 
A Review and Research Agenda, 35 J. MGMT. 469 (2009). 
 96. This is particularly true in the context of early acquirers. Kenneth Carow et al., Do Early 
Birds Get Returns? An Empirical Investigation of Early Mover Advantages in Acquisitions, 25 
STRAT. MGMT. J. 563, 563–66, 580–81 (2004).  
 97. See, e.g., David Teece, Profiting From Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 285–87, 290, 298, 
301–02 (1986). See generally Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, A New Look at the Returns and 
Risks to Pharmaceutical R&D, 36 MGMT. SCI. 804 (1990) (discussing the positive effects of R&D 
investment).   
 98. See Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella, Complementarity and External Linkages: 
The Strategies of the Large Firms in Biotechnology, 38 J. INDUS. ECON. 361, 365–66 (1990). 
 99. Gatum Ahuja & Riittaa Katila, Technological Acquisitions and the Innovation 
Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Longitudinal Study, 22 STRAT. MGMT. J. 197, 197–99 (2001). 
 100. See David R. King et al., Complementary Resources and the Exploitation of 
Technological Innovations, 29 J. MGMT. 589, 589–90 (2003).  
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to create value.101 For example, larger firms may acquire small firms 
because by doing so, they can buy STEM professionals to grow their 
organization.102 Some of these STEM professionals can be redeployed 
across a number of different units within a larger organization. 
Similarly, the seminal work by Teece on dynamic capabilities 
suggests a number of different avenues, including the various internal 
processes and routines of a firm and a firm’s internal organizational 
structure that allow it to utilize its intangible assets.103 Firms are able to 
use dynamic capabilities to adapt to different business environments and 
to shape these environments through innovation and learning.104  
One might imagine that the entrepreneurial firm may position itself so 
that it is rational to be vertically acquired. It, in fact, may base its business 
model on such an acquisition. The objective of the entrepreneurial firm 
is to create a bidding war for its specialized assets among potential 
acquirers. 
Antitrust has not effectively integrated knowledge about the start-up 
ecosystem.  Such knowledge is critical to understand vertical mergers and 
acquisitions that impact questions of competitive effects dealing with 
nascent acquisitions.  Investment by incumbent firms to acquire nascent 
firms implicates issues of corporate venture capital;105 non-financial 
investments in nascent firms via contract such as strategic alliances106 and 
                                                                                                                     
 101. See Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MGMT. 
99, 99–102 (1991); Jeroen Kraaijenbrink et al., The Resource-Based View: A Review and 
Assessment of its Critiques, 36 J. MGMT. 349, 350–51 (2010); Birger Wernerfelt, The Resource-
Based View of the Firm: Ten Years After, 16 STRAT. MGMT. J. 171, 171–72 (1995). 
 102. See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 283–84 (2013) 
(“[T]he buyer’s primary motivation is to hire some or all of the startup’s software engineers.”); 
Kenneth A. Younge et al., How Anticipated Employee Mobility Affects Acquisition Likelihood: 
Evidence From a Natural Experiment, 36 STRAT. MGMT. J. 686, 686–87 (2015).  
 103. See David Teece et al., Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management, 18 STRAT. 
MGMT. J. 509, 509–10, 515–30 (1997). See generally DAVID J. TEECE, DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES 
AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT (2009) (discussing how firms maintain, among other things, 
competitive advantage and market position by focusing on their internal assets and organizational 
structure).   
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MANAGEMENT: ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND PLATFORMS 3, 7 (Jeffrey Furman et al. 
eds., 2017). 
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joint ventures;107 and the entrepreneurial ecosystem,108 that includes, 
among other components, venture capitalists,109  and angel investors.110  
This study of ecosystems is critical as one strategy of established tech 
firms is to push R&D in new products or services down to startups as a 
way to decrease or shift risk.  The more successful startups are then 
acquired by larger technology firms.111 
B.  IPOs Have Been Dying Since the Passage of Sarbanes–Oxley 
One aspect that is missing in the antitrust discussion is the broader 
structural shift that a change of merger policy would mean to how the 
innovation ecosystem is structured, based on the ability for entrepreneurs 
and venture capitalists to exit their investments. This discussion is beyond 
antitrust doctrine. However, this implication of entrepreneurial exit 
(fewer initial public offerings (IPOs) and more vertical mergers) impacts 
competition policy, market structure, and innovation. 
Traditionally, the goal of entrepreneurial exit was an IPO. Today, 
there are far fewer IPOs in the United States than in prior years.112 Indeed, 
between few new listings and an increase in delistings, the number of 
publicly traded companies is much smaller than it has been historically. 
113 As one recent article explains, “[f]rom 1975 to 1996 (the pre-peak 
period), the number of listed firms increases steadily from 4,775 to 8,025, 
a cumulative increase of 68%. Since the peak in 1996, listings fall each 
year from 1997 to 2012 (the post-peak period) and cumulatively decline 
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by 3,923, or 49%, by 2012.”114 Listed company fees, yearly disclosures, 
and compliance, as well as the IPO process itself, may be costly.115  
Other work confirms the changing nature of publicly traded firms 
since the 1990s.116 Listed companies today are older and larger (in more 
concentrated markets) in the modern post-Sarbanes–Oxley regime.117 In 
R&D-intensive industries, this is particularly true.118 These factors 
together show the limits to traditional exit for entrepreneurial firms via 
IPO.  
The lack of IPOs has implications for entrepreneurial exit. An IPO 
allows exit for the early investors in a firm through a public offering of 
securities. The nature of the securities regime shapes the opportunities for 
firms to exit through IPOs, but with IPOs now scarce, vertical mergers 
are the default for entrepreneurial exit. Given that many businesses are 
built for exit via vertical merger, to close off this form of entrepreneurial 
exit at a time when the IPO market is at a significant low would chill 
innovation. 
OVERALL POLICY THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSION 
Vertical merger analysis and antitrust policy have improved with 
better economic tools. Whereas non-economic goals of an earlier era led 
to outcomes that hurt consumers,119 the first generation of economic 
effects-led analysis was perhaps too coarse. Indeed, many Chicago 
School thinkers believed that vertical restraints should be per se legal.120 
Advances in economics have marginalized the belief in per se legality for 
vertical mergers.121 Thus, there are situations in which there should be 
more vertical challenges brought in particular cases within a defined set 
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of parameters. However, this is not to suggest that the presumption of 
vertical mergers being typically procompetitive or competitively neutral 
(at least relative to horizontal mergers) should be abandoned. A large 
body of empirical literature suggests that tech-related vertical mergers 
may indeed be efficiency enhancing. As Jon Sallet, a former Obama 
administration senior appointee in both the Antitrust Division and FCC, 
once concluded about vertical mergers, “[w]e should say, it would be a 
mistake to conclude an inquiry based just on theory without a dedicated 
detective’s desire for detail and data.”122 In this case, the evidence 
suggests that the presumption about when to intervene in antitrust vertical 
cases is typically a sound one and is based on economic evidence as a 
general way to frame limited agency resources in the merger review 
process.  
As a matter of policy, there should be vertical merger enforcement 
when the facts justify such an intervention. However, from a policy 
perspective, vertical mergers—including tech mergers—present fewer 
problems than horizontal mergers and should be treated differently in 
terms of overall merger policy. When antitrust agencies, judges, and 
legislators limit the possibility of vertical mergers as an exit strategy for 
start-up firms, it creates risk for innovation and entrepreneurship. First, it 
complicates how firms think about the make or buy decision in terms of 
the alignment of firm boundaries via contract or ownership. Second, it 
threatens entrepreneurial exits, particularly for tech companies whose 
very business model is premised upon vertical mergers for purposes of a 
liquidity event. Vertical merger guidelines could help address some of 
the uncertainty of vertical merger policy more generally. AT&T was a 
missed opportunity, from a policy perspective, to provide lasting case law 
guidance, thereby making agency guidance that much more important. 
Further, lack of guidance, particularly in the area of nascent competition 
and vertical mergers, puts at risk the entrepreneurial ecosystem that 
drives much of new product and service innovation. 
Overall, vertical merger guidance should be built around the following 
themes. Vertical mergers are more likely to produce efficiencies and less 
likely to raise competitive concerns than horizontal mergers, so there 
should be a different set of policy inferences. Unlike horizontal mergers, 
vertical mergers generally create the benefits of vertical integration and 
do not eliminate a competitor. A combination of presumptions, screening 
conditions, and burden-shifting should be used for vertical merger 
antitrust policy. Vertical mergers should be presumed, subject to rebuttal 
by evidence of likely competitive harm, to be competitively beneficial or 
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neutral.  In terms of the burden of proof, the merger plaintiff (often the 
government) should bear the burden of demonstrating a net harm to 
consumers. 
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